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POLICY DURATION EFFECT UNDER ZERO INTEREST 





A major feature of recent monetary policy in Japan has been heavy reliance on the so-called 
policy duration effect. This policy employs a commitment to compensate for the central 
bank’s inability to lower the interest rate below zero by altering the anticipated course of 
monetary policy actions. This paper analyzes the behavior of the yield curve and examines the 
effectiveness and limitations of monetary policy commitment under zero interest rates with 
four indicators for policy duration effect. Specifically, we extend our previous study (Okina 
and Shiratsuka (2003)) by applying wavelet analysis to indicators for policy duration effect. 
As in the previous study, the policy duration effect was found to be highly effective in 
stabilizing market expectations for the path of short-term interest rates, thereby reducing 
longer-term interest rates and flattening the yield curve. The policy duration effect, however, 
failed to reverse deflationary expectations in financial markets. 
Keywords: zero interest rate policy, quantitative monetary easing, policy duration effects, 
policy commitment, wavelet analysis. 
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I. Introduction 
This paper analyzes the behavior of the yield curve and examines the effectiveness and 
limitations of monetary policy commitment in Japan’s recent deflationary economic 
environment. 
In February 1999, the Bank of Japan (BOJ) began to lower gradually the 
overnight call rate to 0.02 percent.  In April that year, Governor Hayami of the Bank of 
Japan announced the BOJ’s commitment to a zero interest rate until deflationary 
concerns were dispelled.  Then in August 2000, in view of clear signs of a sustained 
recovery in the economy, the BOJ terminated its zero interest rate policy and raised the 
overnight call rate to 0.25 percent.   
However, in late 2000, the economy once again slowed, reflecting adjustments in 
the area of global information technology related to investments and exports.  As a 
result, deflationary concerns intensified.  The BOJ reacted by lowering the policy 
interest rate to 0.15 percent in mid-February 2001, and at the end of March it adopted a 
policy of “quantitative monetary easing.”  In an effort to stabilize CPI inflation at or 
above zero percent, the BOJ then committed itself to targeting the current account 
balance.  This led the overnight call rate to decline initially to 0.01 percent, below the 
0.02 percent low experienced under the BOJ’s zero interest rate policy.  Then, in 
September 2001, the rate further declined to 0.001 percent due to the reduction of the 
interest rate unit for call market transactions from 1/100 percent to 1/1000 percent. 
Even when short-term interest rates have declined to virtually zero, a central bank 
can produce further easing effects by a policy commitment.1  Moreover, a central bank 
can influence market expectations by making an explicit commitment to the duration for 
which it will hold short-term interest rates at virtually zero.  If it succeeds in credibly 
extending its commitment duration, it can reduce long-term interest rates.  We call this 
mechanism the “policy duration effect,” after Fujiki, Okina, and Shiratsuka (2000) and 
Fujiki and Shiratsuka (2002). 
Recent BOJ monetary policy has been characterized by a heavy reliance on the 
policy duration effect.  As mentioned before, under the zero interest rate policy, the 
                                                 
1  See Reifschneider and Williams (2000), Jung, Teranishi, and Watanabe (2001), and Eggertsson and 
Woodford (2003) for detailed discussions on the policy commitment effect when a central bank faces a 
zero boundary of nominal interest rates. 2 
BOJ committed to a zero interest rate until deflationary concerns were dispelled, and 
under the quantitative monetary easing, the BOJ has committed itself to providing 
ample liquidity that easily exceeds the required reserve until CPI inflation stabilizes at 
or above zero percent.  These policy frameworks employ a policy commitment to 
compensate for the central bank’s inability to lower rates below zero by altering the 
anticipated course of monetary policy actions.   
Okina and Shiratsuka (2003) focus on the policy duration effect by analyzing the 
behavior of entire yield curves under the past zero interest rate policy, as well as the 
current quantitative monetary easing.  In Okina and Shiratsuka (2003), we take a two-
step approach.  The first step is to employ a curve-fitting method to estimate a forward 
rate curve by using a set of spot rates with different time-to-maturity for every day, and 
to compile indicators for the policy duration effect.2  The second step is to examine the 
changes in the shape of yield curves and the indicators over time, thereby assessing the 
impacts of the policy duration effect.    
In Okina and Shiratsuka (2003), we concluded that the policy duration effect was 
highly effective in stabilizing market expectations for the path of short-term interest 
rates, thereby bringing down longer-term interest rates and flattening the yield curve.  
However, under conditions of low economic growth, the policy duration effect failed to 
reverse deflationary expectations in the financial markets for the sample period.  The 
expectation of prolonged deflation was most typically observed in reduced long-term 
interest rates, indicating market expectations of sustained deflation for some years 
rather than a rapid reversal. In this paper, we extend our previous analysis of Okina and 
Shiratsuka (2003) by applying wavelet analysis to indicators for policy duration effect 
to check the robustness of our aforementioned conclusions. 
The paper is organized as follows.  Section II summarizes the analytical 
framework employed in Okina and Shiratsuka (2003) for estimating the policy duration 
effect, based on information contained in the yield curve.  Section III provides an 
overview of data and estimation results, including an assessment on the effectiveness of 
the policy duration effect, shown in of Okina and Shiratsuka (2003).  Section IV 
                                                 
2  Assessment of the policy duration effect from observed interest rates can be based on two methods: a 
direct introduction of policy duration effect into a structural model for interest rate dynamics, or analysis 
of the time-series movement of the shape of the yield curve.  We take the latter approach, while Marumo 
et al. (2003) take the former.  3 
reports the results of wavelet analysis to the four indicators for policy duration effect.  
Section V offers a concluding discussion.  Moreover, Appendix 1 provides numerical 
examples of how changes in the parameter values of our yield curve model affect the 
shape of the instantaneous forward rate curve, and Appendix 2 summarizes the basic 
framework of wavelet analysis.   
 
II. Analytical  Framework 
In this section, we briefly review the basic framework for the analysis of the policy 
duration effect employed by Okina and Shiratsuka (2003).  We first define the policy 
duration effect, and then examine how to assess such effects.  In addition, we explain 
the extended versions of Nelson and Siegel’s (1987) model to estimate the shape of the 
yield curve over time.  We then introduce indicators for policy duration effect, based 
on the estimates of the extended Nelson-Siegel model. 
A.  The Policy Duration Effect 
The policy duration effect arises from expectations concerning how long the current 
abundant provision of funds (quantitative easing) will last in the future, rather than the 
current availability of funds.   
The BOJ’s zero interest rate policy, associated with its commitment to sustaining 
this policy until deflationary concerns are dispelled, and quantitative monetary easing 
with a similar commitment later, are both highly effective in stabilizing market 
expectations for the path of short-term interest rates.  Guiding the overnight rate to 
virtually zero for a considerable period of time serves to anchor medium- to long-term 
interest rates.  As a result, the yield curve flattens and stabilizes at very low levels. 
The above policy duration effect mechanism is underpinned by the expectations 
hypothesis regarding the term structure of interest rates.  The pure expectations theory 
of the term structure of interest rates tells us that long-term interest rates today should 
reflect the future course of short-term interest rates.3  For example, a one-year interest 
rate is determined by market expectations for overnight interest rates during the 
subsequent twelve-month period.  Based on a more practical and general formula, long-
term interest rates are the sum of market expectations for the path of short-term interest 
                                                 
3  See Goodfriend (1998) regarding an excellent discussion on the use of the term structure of interest 
rates for monetary policy analysis.  4 
rates and a term premium (based on risks posed by uncertainties or preferences of 
market participants).  With premiums being constant, fluctuations of interest rates on 
term instruments reflect changes in expectations.4 
B.  The Extended Model of Nelson and Siegel (1987)   
We employ an extended version of Nelson and Siegel’s (1987) model, proposed by 
Söderlind and Svensson (1997).5   
Our specification of the instantaneous forward rate (IFR) for a settlement at 
period m, denoted by r(m), is 
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where β0, β1, β2, β3, τ1 and τ2 are parameters to be estimated from the data.  We expect 
β0, τ1 and τ2 to be positive.   
The IFR curve, generated by equation (1), includes four terms.  The first term is a 
constant β0.  The second term is an exponential function β1*exp(−m/τ1).  When β1 
takes a negative (positive) value, this term produces an upward-trending (downward-
trending) shape in the short end of the IFR curve.  A large (small) value of τ1 means 
that this exponential effect decays more slowly (quickly).  The third term is 
β2*(m/τ1)*exp(−m/τ1), producing a U-shape (hump shape) when β2 takes a negative 
(positive) value.  The fourth term produces a U-shape (hump shape) when β3 takes a 
negative (positive) value.  τ2 controls the rate of convergence of the fourth term, as 
does τ1 for the second and third terms. 
The specification for the spot rate at maturity m, denoted R(m), can in turn be 
derived by integrating the equation (1) from zero to m and dividing by m.  That is  
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and the specific functional form employed in the estimation is as follows: 
                                                 
4  Given the possibility of time-varying risk premiums, we must be cautious in interpreting time-series 
movements of estimates. 
5  The extended Nelson-Siegel model, shown in equation (1), adds the third term to the original one, 
thus allowing up to two hump- or U-shapes in the IFR curve, while the original one has only one hump- 
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The important features of equations (1) and (3) are that the limits of forward and 
spot rates when maturity approaches zero and infinity, respectively, are equal to β0+β1 
and β0.6   
C.  Indicators for the Policy Duration Effect 
We next define indicators for the policy duration effect by exploiting parameters for the 
extended Nelson-Siegel model.  Figure 1 illustrates the indicators using the following 
parameter values: β0 = 2.8, β1 = −2.8, β2 = 0.0, β3 = −6.0, τ1 = 0.3, τ2 = 1.0.  In this 
figure, the upper and lower thin curving lines indicate the IFR curve, r(m), and the spot 
rate curve, R(m), respectively.  r(m) starts from zero at maturity zero, manifests a two-
stage upward trend from the short end to mid-range, and finally converges to a long-
term forward rate of β0, shown as a dashed horizontal line close to the top. 
In order to capture market expectations on the duration of the policy commitment 
as well as the policy impacts, we define four indicators for the policy duration effect 
below.  First, we define the policy duration, denoted by PD, at the point τ2, where r(m) 
becomes increasingly upward-trending in the second stage increase, typically at the 
year-to-settlement of around one year or more.  As mentioned earlier, the fourth term in 
the right hand side of equation (1) takes a minimum value at this point.  All the 
downward factors are exhausted at this point, since τ2 always take a larger value than τ1.  
In the figure, PD is one year, indicated by the first dashed vertical line to the left.7 
                                                 
6  In our estimation, we exploit the first feature to keep the very short end of the IFR curve from 
becoming negative, by imposing the restriction that the overnight uncollateralized call rate be equal to 
β0+β1.  This restriction is sufficient to prevent the zero-bound of nominal interest rates from influencing 
the estimates.  We also use the second feature to compile an indicator for policy duration effect since it 
corresponds to the restriction that forward rates for settlements very far into the future be constant. 
7  An alternative definition of PD is possible, depending on how we define the end of the flattened zone 
before the second stage increase.  For example, it could also be defined as the point at which the second 
derivative of r(m), or acceleration of the speed of increase in r(m), is locally maximized.  Although the 
estimates based on our definition are somewhat greater than those based on the alternative definition, 6 
Second, we use the estimated spot rate at PD, R(PD), as a measure of market 
confidence in the BOJ’s policy commitment to a zero interest rate.8  This is because, as 
shown in equation (2), R(PD) is equivalent to the lower area of the IFR curve from zero 
to PD.  That is, 
  ∫ = =
PD
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In other words, R(PD) is the averaged IFR between zero and PD.  A smaller R(PD) 
implies that financial market participants expect a lower path of short-term interest rates 
and have greater confidence in the BOJ’s commitment to zero interest rates.  In the 
figure, R(PD) is approximately equal to 0.4 percent, shown as a dashed horizontal line 
close to the bottom.  It is equivalent to the shaded area, or the integral of the IFR curve 
from zero to PD, divided by PD.  
Third, we employ a slope of r(m) at the inflection point as a proxy for the flatness 
of the whole shape of the curve.  Due to the definition of the inflection point, this is the 
maximum grade of r(m) in the second stage increase.  r(m) then gradually converges to 
the long-term forward rate, given by β0.  This slope is denoted SL.  Given that the 
inflection point approximately corresponds to 2*τ2 in our specification, the slope at this 
point is:  
  )) * 2 ( arctan( 2 τ r SL ′ = .  (5)
In the figure, 2*τ2 is 2.0 years, depicted by the second dashed vertical line from the left.  
SL is approximately 39.5 degrees. 
Fourth, we use β0, which corresponds to a long-term forward rate, or LFR, as a 
proxy for the summation of expected inflation and expected economic growth, or 
expected nominal economic growth.9  More precisely, the steady-state nominal interest 
rate i* is equal to the sum of the steady-state real interest rate r* and the steady-state 
                                                                                                                                               
these two estimates show very similar movements over time, with a very high coefficient of correlation of 
0.96.  Our definition offers the advantage that we can easily compute standard errors for PD as well as 
R(PD) based on the closed form solution for PD. 
8  As shown by Fujiki and Shiratsuka (2002), r(m) is also affected by the liquidity concerns of financial 
institutions, especially at the time of large liquidity events, such as the Y2K problem and the introduction 
of the real time gross settlement system. 
9  In examining the time-series movements of the long-term forward rate, we need to be careful to 
account for the possible effects of demand-supply conditions in financial markets with long-term maturity.   7 
rate of inflation π* by Fisher’s equation.  Thus, LFR can be written as     
  ρ π ρ + + = + =
∗ ∗ ∗ r i LFR ,  (6)
where ρ is a risk premium.  This is deemed to reflect market expectations for long-term 
economic performance. 
Among the four indicators for the policy duration effect, it should be noted that 
the first two indicators look at the term structure of interest rates in the short term, 
tracing the expected initial impacts of policy actions.  In contrast, the other two 
indicators focus on the term structure at the medium- to long-term to extract an 
indication of market expectations regarding future inflation and real interest rates, 
thereby indicating market assessments of those policy impacts.  
 
III.  Empirical Evidence on the Policy Duration Effect 
In this section, we summarize empirical findings on the policy duration effect in Okina 
and Shiratsuka (2003).  We first present the data used to estimate the IFR curve over 
time and provide the estimated results of the extended Nelson-Siegel model.  In 
addition, we compute indicators for the policy duration effect, based on the estimation 
result for the IFR curve. 
A. Data   
We use data for euro-yen Tokyo interbank offered rates (TIBOR) as short-term interest 
rates, ranging from one- to twelve-month contracts, and yen swap rates as medium- to 
long-term interest rates from two- to twelve-year contracts.10  As mentioned earlier, we 
also use the overnight uncollateralized call rate to impose the restriction that the 
overnight call rate be equal to β0+β1.  The sample period,  which is determined by data 
availability, is every business day from March 2, 1998 to February 28, 2003.11  
                                                 
10  As pointed out in Shigemi et al. (2000) and Fukuta, Saito, and Takagi (2002), the pricing of Japanese 
government bonds (hereafter JGBs) crucially depends on their convenience, reflecting a difference in the 
characteristics of each issue, such as outstanding volume and coupon rate, as well as market liquidity.  In 
particular, the pricing of JGBs in 1998-2000 was highly distorted by various problems in market liquidity, 
including the Y2K problem.  It would thus be difficult to extract a unique yield curve as a benchmark 
from the market rates of JGBs, given the possible effects of the credit premium and other perturbing 
factors, such as macro-hedge accounting, on euro-yen TIBORs and swap rates. 
11  Our sample period corresponds approximately to Governor Hayami’s term of office (from March 20, 
1998 to March 19, 2003).  However, it should be noted that our sample period starts shortly before the 8 
B.  Estimated Results for the Nelson-Siegel Model 
Figure 2, as indicated from the top to the bottom panels, respectively summarizes the 
estimated results of Okina and Shiratsuka (2003) for parameters β0, β1, β2, β3, τ1, and 
τ2.12  In each panel, a solid line shows the estimated parameters.  Shaded lines show 
the upper and lower bounds of the confidence interval for each parameter, obtained by 
adding and subtracting two times the standard errors of the estimated coefficient. 
The magnitudes and signs of the estimated parameters are consistent with our 
assumptions for the typical shape of the IFR curve since 1998.  For example, β0 and β1 
typically range from 2 to 3, and −3 to −2, respectively, except for the periods of the JGB 
market boom in the fall of 1998 and in January 2003.  β2 deviates insignificantly from 
zero, except for the period when the IFR curve manifests a complex shape, such as the 
initial stage of the zero interest rate policy, and the end of a fiscal year or end of the 
reserve maintenance period when the overnight rate temporarily jumps.  β3 always 
takes a negative value, and has been stable, ranging from −6.0 to −3.5, except in 1999, 
when it often had values less than –7.0.  τ1 and τ2  always take positive values and were 
stable until 2000, rising gradually from the beginning of 2001.   
Okina and Shiratsuka (2003) examine the robustness of estimation results against 
the zero-bound of nominal interest rates by using the trade date January 29, 2003 as an 
example, when β0 or LFR take a minimum value in the sample period.  Figure 3 plots 
observed spot rates and estimated spot and instantaneous forward rates.  The circles are 
observed spot rates for the overnight call rate, 12 euro-yen TIBORs, and 13 yen swap 
rates.  The thin and bold lines indicate the estimated spot and instantaneous forward 
rates, respectively.  The shaded lines associated with these two lines indicate their 
confidence intervals, computed using the delta method. 
We can see from the figure that the parameters for the extended Nelson-Siegel 
model are a fairly precise estimation, and that the confidence intervals for the spot and 
instantaneous forward rates are very narrow.  The figure apparently indicates that 
restricting the shortest end to equivalency to the overnight uncollateralized call rate is 
sufficient to keep the zero-bound of nominal interest rates from influencing the 
                                                                                                                                               
launch of the ZIRP.  Thus, it is difficult to compare the yield curve behavior under the ZIRP and the 
QME with those under a normal policy regime in which nominal short-term interest rates are well above 
zero. 
12  Our estimations use the CML procedure in GAUSS 3.5. 9 
estimates, even under the recent low and flat yield curve. 
C.  Estimated Indicators for Policy Duration Effect 
Okina and Shiratsuka (2003) compute indicators for the policy duration effect, based on 
the estimated results in the previous section, and assess the policy duration effect under 
the zero interest rate policy as well as quantitative monetary easing.   
Figure 4 displays the computed results of the aforementioned indicators over time 
shown in Okina and Shiratsuka (2003): panel [1] represents the policy duration (PD = 
τ2), panel [2] represents the estimated spot rate at PD (R(PD)), panel [3] represents the 
slope of the IFR curve at the inflection point (SL = arctan(r´(2*τ2))), and panel [4] 
represents the long-term forward rate (LFR = β0).  The figure also shows the 
confidence intervals for each indicator by shaded lines, obtained by adding and 
subtracting two times the standard errors for each indicator.13 
Among the four indicators, PD and R(PD) look at the term structure of interest 
rates in the short horizon, tracing the expected initial impacts of policy actions.  In 
contrast, SL and LFR focus on the term structure for the medium- to long-term to extract 
an indication of market expectations regarding future inflation and real interest rates, 
thereby deriving market assessments of those policy impacts. 
Panel [1] of the figure shows that PD has three upward trend phases: (i) the period 
soon after the launch of the zero interest rate policy, (ii) the period from the beginning 
of 2001 to June 2001, and (iii) the period from April 2002 to end of 2002.  Among the 
three phases, the last phase exhibits more persistent but less rapid increases than do the 
previous two. 
Panel [2] displays two major declines for R(PD): one for February to March 1999, 
and the other for early 2001.  Both cases show significant declines of approximately 40 
basis points in a month.  The first decline is soon after the launch of the zero interest 
rate policy, while the second one is shortly before the launch of quantitative monetary 
easing, not after.  In the latter case, a large part of the commitment effect appears in 
advance to making an explicit commitment.  
Panel [3] shows that SL declines significantly three times, each corresponding to 
the three rising phases of PD.  The first decline, after the launch of the zero interest rate 
policy, led to a subsequent rebound, as business conditions recovered, especially after 
                                                 
13  We apply the delta method to compute standard errors for R(PD) and SL. 10 
spring 2000.  In contrast, the second decline did not appear to be accompanied by a 
significant rebound, and the third decline persists as of February 2003, which is the end 
of the sample period for our estimations. 
Panel [4] demonstrates that LFR has a general downward trend since 2000, with 
some cyclical ups and downs within this downward trend.  Declines grow with passing 
time, while rebounds become weaker.  Moreover, a major decline is observed 
following the beginning of 2003, reflecting prolonged deflationary expectations in the 
financial markets. 
To sum up our empirical observations on the policy duration indicators in Okina 
and Shiratsuka (2003), 14 PD generally increases over time, while the other three 
indicators, R(PD), SL and LFR, decline.  Increased PD and declined R(PD) indicate 
that the IFR curve in the short end becomes flatter, and declined SL and LFR imply that 
the IFR curve in the longer end levels off as well. 
The above observation suggests two points.  First, quantitative monetary easing 
within the sample period strengthened the policy duration effect, enhancing market 
credibility to the BOJ’s commitment to zero interest rates.  Second, in spite of such a 
policy duration effect, even though it was fairly strong, it largely failed to reverse 
market expectations that deflation and low economic growth would persist well into the 
future.  Rather, the policy duration effect confined market expectations of prolonged 
deflation, thereby leading market participants to adjust to such a state of the economy.  
This in turn made it more difficult for the BOJ to reverse deflationary expectations. 
If the policy duration effect is strong enough to alter market expectations 
regarding the future course of the economy in a positive direction, the slope of the IFR 
curve in the mid-range as well as the long-term forward rate are expected to increase.  
In addition, such positive expectations in turn shorten the expected duration of the 
policy commitment to a zero interest rate or quantitative monetary easing.  On the other 
hand, if the policy duration effect is not sufficiently effective and expectations of 
deflation and low economic growth remain, the slope of the IFR curve in the mid-range 
and the long-term forward rate are unlikely to increase. 
Quantitative monetary easing also reduces the incentive for financial institutions 
                                                 
14  In Okina and Shiratsuka (2003), we also carry out case study analyses to detect the impact of changes 
in monetary policy in the short run, which are of interest, but not shown here because of space constraints. 11 
to assume interest rate risks.  As market expectations of a prolonged zero interest rate 
intensify, financial institutions are more likely to purchase JGBs with less concern for 
interest rate risks and potential capital losses.  In fact, they are less likely to hedge their 
interest rate risks from a massive purchase of JGBs by swapping fixed rates in exchange 
for floating rates.  As a result, the yen swap rate declined substantially from mid-1999, 
and the yen swap spread, defined as the difference between the yen swap rate and the 
JGB rate at the same maturity, has been reduced to below zero since the end of 2001, as 
shown in Figure 6.  This observation implies that interbank markets not only for short-
term contracts but also for longer-term contracts have virtually ceased to function as a 
risk-sharing device among financial institutions and are insensitive to interest risks.  
 
IV.  Wavelet Analysis on Indicators for Policy Duration Effect 
In this section, we apply the wavelet analysis to indicators for policy duration effect, 
and examine policy duration effect to reinforce our findings in Okina and Shiratsuka 
(2003). 
A.  Policy Duration Effect and Wavelet Analysis 
A wavelet is a small wave, and wavelet analysis expresses a time series as a sum of 
localized small and temporary waves.  This technique enables us to decompose a time 
series into both frequency domain and time domain simultaneously.  As a result, it has 
an advantage in analyzing data that show irregular fluctuations as well as time-varying 
frequency characteristics.  
In contrast, Fourier analysis, often used in analyzing frequency characteristics of 
time series data, decompose a time series into a sum of sine and cosine functions at 
different wavelengths.  Fourier analysis, however, has a limitation in that it is unable to 
capture time-varying frequency characteristics, if any, because information on time 
domain is lost.  
As we can see from the empirical evidence of Okina and Shiratsuka (2003) 
summarized above, it is important to note the time-varying nature of policy impacts 
under the zero interest rate policy and quantitative monetary easing.  Such a time-
varying nature comes from two elements: one is the accumulation of experience on the 
part of market participants, and the other is a change in financial and macroeconomic 
environments.  Given this, it seems interesting to examine policy duration effect from 12 
the viewpoint of how frequency characteristics of indicators for policy duration effect 
evolved.  Such an analysis serves to strengthen our empirical results in Okina and 
Shiratsuka (2003). 
B.  Wavelet Analysis on Indicators for Policy Duration Effect 
We apply wavelet analysis to the four indicators for policy duration effect (Figure 5).15  
In this figure, we decompose indicators for policy duration effect into six components: a 
low-frequency component (wavelet smooth at level 5) and five higher-frequency 
components (wavelet details at levels 1 to 5).  Specifically, the wavelet smooth at level 
5, shown in the top panel, captures a trend component by removing cyclical components 
up to the frequency of 2
5 or one and half months.  The wavelet details at levels 1 
through 5, shown from the second top panel to the bottom panel, indicate a stationary 
component with the frequency of two, four, eight, 16, and 32 business days, 
respectively. 
The estimation period for wavelet analysis is from March 24, 1998 to February 28, 
2003.  This is slightly shorter than the sample period of our data set, because wavelet 
decomposition up to level 5 requires a sample size that is a multiple of 2
5=32.  We set 
the end of the estimation period as the end of our data set, and then decide the beginning 
of the estimation period retroactively so that the sample size is equal to 1,216, which is 
the greatest multiple of 32 within our data set.  
PD in Figure 5[1] exhibits three phases of upward trending.  During the first two 
phases, that is, soon after the launch of the zero interest rate policy and before and after 
the launch of quantitative monetary easing, the volatility at levels 1 to 3 with higher 
frequency increases.  In contrast, during the third phase, the volatility of higher 
frequency fluctuations remains stable.  This suggests that market expectations with 
respect to prolonging policy duration were formed in an extremely smooth manner 
during the third phase.  
R(PD) in Figure 5[2] shows declines in the whole range of cyclical components 
from levels 1 to 5 since the launch of the zero interest rate policy.  This is particularly 
true for the period from late 2001 to early 2003.  In addition, the wavelet smooth at 
                                                 
15  We choose the Daubechies (10) wavelet, D(10), by comparing wavelet filters with a certain length of 
support in order to extract trend fluctuations of policy duration indicators.  See Appendix 2 for a brief 
summary of wavelet analysis.  13 
level 5 declines markedly.  These observations reveal that market credibility to the 
BOJ’s commitment to a zero interest rate was enhanced, and was stabilized at a high 
level during the period of quantitative monetary easing.  
SL in Figure 5[3] is characterized by the stabilization of the whole range of 
cyclical components especially since 2002.  These observations offer the possibility 
that the yield curve in the mid-range became fairly stable in a smooth manner during the 
aforementioned third phase of upward trending in PD.  In other words, this implies that 
the policy duration effect functioned as an anchor for yield curve formation in the mid-
range.  
LFR in Figure 5[4] shows the stabilization of cyclical components at all levels in 
2002, suggesting that market expectations on long-term interest rates were stably 
formed.  Especially, a decline in volatility of wavelet detail at level 5 suggests the 
possibility that deflationary expectations became increasingly confined.  
The above observations suggest two points, which are consistent with the 
empirical evidence in Okina and Shiratsuka (2003).  First, quantitative monetary easing 
within the sample period strengthened the policy duration effect, enhancing the market 
credibility to the BOJ’s commitment to a zero interest rate.  Second, in spite of such a 
policy duration effect, even though it was fairly strong, it largely failed to reverse 
market expectations that deflation and low economic growth would persist well into the 
future.  Rather, the policy duration effect confined market expectations of prolonged 
deflation, thereby leading market participants to adjust to such a state of the economy.  
This in turn made it more difficult for the BOJ to reverse deflationary expectations. 
 
V. Concluding  Remarks 
In this paper, we have examined the policy commitment effect, or policy duration effect, 
of recent monetary policy in Japan, which has been characterized by the unusual 
environment of zero nominal short-term interest rates. To do so, we first reviewed the 
analytical framework and results of Okina and Shiratsuka (2003), and then we 
introduced wavelet analysis to four indicators of policy duration effects. 
Wavelet analysis in this paper confirmed the conclusions of Okina and Shiratsuka 
(2003).  First, the policy duration effect was very effective in stabilizing market 
expectations for the path of short-term interest rates, lowering longer-term interest rates 
and flattening the yield curve.  In fact, this policy has played a certain role in bolstering 14 
Japan’s economy, such as contributing to stabilizing the financial system.  Second, 
however, expectations of prolonged deflation are most typically signaled by lowered 
long-term interest rates, indicating financial market expectations that deflation will 
persist for years, rather than rapidly reversing.  
 
 
Appendix 1.    An Illustration of the Contributions of Each Component in 
the Nelson-Siegel Model 
In Appendix 1, we provide an intuitive account of the estimates for the extended 
Nelson-Siegel model.   
Figure A-1 plots hypothetical IFR curves for the extended version of the Nelson-
Siegel model with the following parameters: β0 = 2.8, β1 = −2.8, β2 = 0.0, β3 = −6.0, τ1 
= 0.3, τ2 = 1.0 for the upper panel, and β0 = 2.8, β1 = −2.3, β2 = −1.0, β3 = −6.0, τ1 = 0.3, 
τ2 = 1.0 for the lower panel.  The parameters are common except for β1 and β2.  These 
parameters are chosen because they represent typical shapes of the IFR curve under a 
zero interest rate policy and quantitative monetary easing.  The upper panel illustrates 
the most typical shape of the IFR curve.  The lower panel corresponds to a situation 
wherein the overnight rate temporarily jumps at the end of the calendar year, the fiscal 
year, or the reserve maintenance period.16   
This figure also shows the contributions of each term.  The first and fourth terms 
occur in both panels since the same parameters except for β1 and β2 are used.  The first 
term,  β0, is constant over the whole range of time-to-settlement.  The second term 
β1*exp(−m/τ1) is an exponential function, exhibiting an upward trend in the short end of 
the IFR curve when β1 is negative.  This impact decays gradually (quickly) as τ1 
becomes larger (smaller).  The third term in the lower panel, β2*(−m/τ1)*exp(−m/τ1), 
creates a U-shape in the short-term since β2 is negative.   
The fourth term, β3*(−m/τ2)*exp(−m/τ2), also adds a U-shape since β3 is negative 
(a hump shape when positive).  This term allows a non-monotonic increase in the IFR 
                                                 
16  r(0), which is equal to β0+β1, is supposed to be zero under the zero interest rate policy as well as 
quantitative monetary easing, as shown in the upper panel, while r(0) in the lower panel, which is also 
equal to β0+β1, is significantly higher than zero.  Since β0 is equal to the limits of forward and spot rates 
when maturity approaches infinity, this parameter is common to both panels.  Therefore, the absolute 
value of β1 must take a different value from that of β0 when the overnight rate temporarily jumps. 15 
curve.  In addition, this U-shape decays slower than that of the third term because τ2 is 
larger than τ1.  A large (small) value of τ2 means that the effects decay more slowly 
(quickly), and the IFR converges to the long-term forward rate more slowly (quickly). 
Since β3 is negative, the fourth term creates a U-shape, taking a minimum at τ2 
and an inflection point at 2*τ2.  Moreover, the point of 2*τ2 approximately corresponds 
to the inflection point for the overall IFR curve since the second and the fourth terms 
almost converge to zero at the point of 2*τ2.  Therefore, at this point, r′(m) is 
approximately locally maximized and r′′(m) is approximately zero.  
 
Appendix 2.    A Basic Framework of Wavelet Analysis 
In Appendix 2, we offer a brief exposition of wavelet analysis by focusing on the basic 
framework of discrete wavelet transform.  See Schleicher (2002), for example, for 
details on wavelets for applications to economic analysis.  
A. Wavelet  Filter 
Wavelet analysis can be viewed as a kind of linear filtering.  Wavelet filter h is defined 
so as to satisfy the conditions below:  
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where L denotes the length of filter or support.  The first condition implies that the 
filter is a high-pass filter that captures cyclical fluctuations and extracts high frequency 
components.  The second condition is for standardization.  The third condition means 
that filters are orthogonal to each other with respect to a shift of even numbers.  
Scaling filter g, which is twin to the wavelet filter, is defined so as to satisfy the 
quadrature mirror relationship below:  
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Given the above relationship, a scaling filter is shown to meet the conditions below:  
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The first condition implies that the scaling filter is a low-pass filter to extract low 
frequency components.  The second and third conditions are respectively for 
standardization and orthogonality, which are the same as for the wavelet filter.  Then, 








n k kh g ,  (n is a non-zero integer)  (A-4)
which implies that the wavelet filter and scaling filter are orthogonal to each other with 
respect to a shift of even numbers.  
The family of Daubechies wavelets is one of the often-used wavelets.  Let D(L) 
denote the Daubechies wavelet with support L (L is an even number), then D(L) is 
defined so as to simultaneously satisfy the equation (A-1) as well as the set of equations 
(L/2−1) below:  
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For example, the Daubechies wavelets with the support of 10, or D(10), is yielded from 
a set of equations (A-5) by setting i = 4. 
B. Wavelet  Transform 
The process of decomposing a time series into the time and frequency domains by using 
a wavelet filter is referred as wavelet transform.  This process yields wavelet 
coefficients and scaling coefficients.  In reverse, the process of reproducing the original 
time series from wavelet and scaling coefficients is referred to as inverse wavelet 
transform. 
Now, let x be a sequence of the time series, and suppose the length of time series 
is N.  Let wi and vi denote the wavelet coefficient and scaling coefficient at level i.  In 
addition, let us define the scaling coefficient at level 0 as being equal to the time series 
data, and v0=x.  When we apply the wavelet filter h with support L to the scaling 
coefficient at level i−1, vi−1, we obtain the wavelet coefficient at level I, wi, from the 
equation below:  
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Here, AmodB is the operator that divides A by B and returns only the remainder, thus 
producing an integer ranging from zero to B−1.  Similarly, when we apply the scaling 
filter g with support L to the scaling coefficient at level i−1, vi−1, we obtain the scaling 
coefficient at level i, wi, from the equation below:  
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What should be noted here is that the downsampling operation proceeds by every 
second data point.  A process of filtering reduces computed wavelet and scaling 
coefficients by halves.  However, the sum of the two coefficients is equal to the 
original time series, and no information is lost through filtering.  
Since wavelet transform preserves all information contained by the original time 
series, the original series can be reproduced from the computed wavelet and scaling 
coefficients.  This process is called inverse wavelet transform.  
The process of reproducing the scaling coefficient at level i, vi, from the wavelet 
coefficient at level i+1, wi+1, and the scaling coefficient at level i+1, vi+1, is given below.  
First, upsampling is implemented to increase the reduced number of data at level 
i+1 by downsampling by inserting zeros between samples.  Precisely, upsampled 
sequences of wavelet and scaling coefficients at level i+1, that is w
0
i+1 = (0, wi+1,1, 0, 
wi+1,2, …, 0, wi+1,N/2i+1) and v
0
i+1 = (0, vi+1,1, 0, vi+1,2, …, 0, vi+1,N/2i+1), is made.  
Next, the wavelet and scaling filters are applied to the upsampled wavelet and 
scaling coefficients, and by summing up this result, the scaling coefficient at level i is 
obtained.  That is  
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C. Multiresolution  Analysis 
Finally, we review multiresolution analysis.  Wavelet detail and wavelet smooth are the 
basic concepts in this analysis.  Wavelet detail and smooth at level i respectively 
capture cyclical components with the frequency of 2
i and trend components after 
removing the cyclical components up to the frequency of 2
i. 
Suppose that some levels of wavelet coefficients and scaling coefficients are 
obtained from the original time series by implementing wavelet transform.  Then 
wavelet detail at level i, with the same length of time series as the original time series, is 
obtained by implementing inverse wavelet transform while replacing all wavelet and 
scaling coefficients being equal to zero except for the wavelet coefficient at level i wi.  
Similarly, wavelet smooth at level i si is obtained by implementing inverse wavelet 
transform vi. 
When we define s0=x, the following equation holds: 
  i i i s d s + = −1 .  (A-4)18 
And, when we define wavelet rough as ri=Σ
i
k=1dk, the following equation holds: 
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Forward rate curve: r(m)
PD=τ 2 2*τ 2
Long run forward rate: β 0
Inflection point:
Local max of  r'(m)
Policy duration:
Min of 3rd term
 in r(m)
Spot rate at PD: R(PD)




Notes: Forward rate and spot rate curves are computed by equations (1) and (3), respectively, using 
the following parameter values: β0 = 2.8, β1 = −2.8, β2 = 0.0, β3 = −6.0, τ1 = 0.3, τ2 = 1.0.   
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Note:  1.  Bold lines are estimated coefficients, and shaded lines indicate their upper and lower 
bounds, respectively, of the confidence interval (estimated coefficients ± 2*standard errors). 
2.  The solid and dotted vertical lines, respectively, indicate the year-end and quarter-end. 
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Note:  The circles are observed spot rates for the overnight call rate, 12 euro yen TIBORs, and 13 
yen swap rates.  The thin and bold lines show the estimated spot rates and instantaneous 
forward rates, respectively.  The shaded lines associated with these two lines indicate their 
confidence intervals.  The estimates of parameter values are as follows: β0 = 1.787 (s.e. = 
0.036), β1 = −1.785 (s.e. = 0.036), β2 = −0.000 (s.e. = 0.170), β3 = −4.221 (s.e. = 0.083), 
τ1 = 0.720 (s.e. = 0.079), and τ2 = 2.266 (s.e. = 0.073). 
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Figure 4.  The Policy Duration Effect 
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Note:   The solid and dotted vertical lines, respectively, indicate the year-end and quarter-end. 24 
Figure 5.  Wavelet Transform of Indicators for Policy Duration Effect 
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Figure 5 (continued) 
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Figure 5 (continued) 







1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003








1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003








1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003








1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003








1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003








1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
wavelet detail level (4)
 27 
Figure 5 (continued) 
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Figure A-1.  Illustrated IFR Curve 
 











β 0 = 2.8, β 1 = −2.8, β 2 = 0.0,
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Notes: Forward rate and spot rate curves are computed by equations (1) and (3), respectively, using 
the following parameter values: β0 = 2.8, β1 = −2.8, β2 = 0.0, β3 = −6.0, τ1 = 0.3, τ2 = 1.0 for 
the upper panel; and β0 = 2.8, β1 = −2.3, β2 = −1.0, β3 = −6.0, τ1 = 0.3, τ2 = 1.0 for the lower 
panel. 
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